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The Hague Convention on International
Child Abduction: A Practical
Application
I. INTRODUCTION
The abduction of children to foreign countries by non-custodial
parents is a problem of increasing concern in many countries. As of
May 1, 1986, the United States State Department had 2,184 reported
cases of child abduction.1 There were an additional 169 cases re-
ported by December 31, 1986.2 The number of United States citizens
seeking the return of abducted children abroad increased by approxi-
mately forty cases per month in the three year period from 1983 to
1986.3 These figures are especially significant when one considers that
this number has shown a consistent increase over the last few years.
One of the reasons international child abduction has become
more serious is the escalating divorce rate in the United States and
other Western countries. 4 The United States alone had 1,182,000 di-
vorces in 1980.5 This was a substantial increase from the number of
United States divorces in 1975. A second reason for an increase in
international child abduction has been the relative ease with which
people can now engage in foreign travel. 6 These two factors have
1. Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction Before the
Senate Foreign Relations Comm. at 7 (June 11, 1986) (written statement of Mary Mochary,
Deputy Legal Adviser) [hereinafter Mochary]. "As of May 1, 1983 the Department of State
had been informed of 677 cases of allegedly wrongfully removed or retained children normally
resident in the United States." Id.
2. Letter from J. Edward Fox, Assistant Secretary, Legislative and Intergovernmental
Affairs to George Bush, President, United States Senate (undated) (hereinafter "Letter"].
3. Mochary, supra note 1, at 7.
4. Jones, Council of Europe Convention on Recognition and Enforcement of Decisions
Relating to the Custody of Children, 30 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 467 (1981).
5. Comment, American and International Responses to International Child Abductions,
16 N.Y.U. INT'L L. & POL. 415, 416 n.4 (1984). Statistics from the Bureau of the Census, U.S.
Dep't of Commerce, Statistical Abstract of the United States: 1982-83 at 60 (103d ed. 1983),
show that in 1970 the United States divorce rate was 708,000. That rate had risen to 1,036,000
in 1975 and in 1980 had reached 1,182,000. Id.
6. See Comment, supra note 5, at 416. Statistics from the Bureau of the Census, U.S.
Dep't of Commerce, Statistical Abstract of the United States 1982-83 at 4 (103d ed. 1983),
show that during the period from 1975 to 1980, 45.1% of the United States population moved
at least once within the United States and 1.9% of the United States population in 1980 had
moved to the United States from a foreign country. Id.
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been major influences on the increase in the number of international
child abductions seen in recent years.
"Child snatching" 7 occurs when a child has been removed or re-
tained in breach of a parent's custody rights.8 The breaching parent
can either remove the child from the child's habitual residence and
take the child to a second jurisdiction, or retain the child in the sec-
ond jurisdiction after an authorized visitation period.9
In either event, the psychological effect on the child can be dev-
astating. In addition to the trauma suffered from the divorce itself,
the child now has the additional difficulty of being subjected to an
international abduction. A child's strong need for stability and secur-
ity is disrupted, often leaving the child with emotional problems.10
This Comment will first discuss the United States' responses to
interstate abduction through legislation enacted at the state and fed-
eral levels. Second, this Comment will address the responses from the
international community: the Council of Europe's Convention on
Recognition and Enforcement of Decisions Concerning Custody of
Children and on Restoration of Custody of Children (Strasbourg
Convention)1' and the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of In-
ternational Child Abduction (Hague Convention or Convention). 12
This Comment will also look at proposed federal legislation in the
United States and examine how this legislation would facilitate imple-
mentation of the Hague Convention in the United States. Finally, this
Comment will consider a practical application of the Hague Conven-
tion and its interaction with existing United States law.
II. THE AMERICAN RESPONSE
A. The Historical Background Leading to the Uniform Child
Custody Jurisdiction Act and the Parental Kidnapping Act.
The United States' initial response to the problem of child abduc-
7. See generally, S. KATZ, CHILD SNATCHING (1981) [hereinafter KATZ].
8. Id. at 90.
9. See Comment, supra note 5, at 415.
10. Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction Before the
Senate Foreign Relations Comm., at 9 (June 11, 1986) (statement of Arthur W. Rovine, Chair-
man, Section of International Law and Practice, American Bar Association) [hereinafter
Rovine].
11. Reprinted in EXPLANATORY REPORT ON THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON RECOG-
NITION AND ENFORCEMENT OF DECISIONS CONCERNING CUSTODY OF CHILDREN AND ON
RESTORATION OF CUSTODY OF CHILDREN 23-36 (1980) [hereinafter Strasbourg Convention].
12. Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, Oct. 25,
1980, I.L.M. 1506 [hereinafter Hague Convention] reprinted in 51 Fed. Reg. 58, 10498 (1986).
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tions has been to enact legislation to handle interstate abductions.
The Uniform Child Custody and Jurisdiction Act (UCCJA) 13 and Pa-
rental Kidnapping Prevention Act (PKPA) 14 were enacted in re-
sponse to the lack of uniform enforcement of custody decrees from
one state to another. The UCCJA has been adopted by all fifty states
while the PKPA was enacted at the federal level.
Prior to enactment of the UCCJA, a custodial parent could re-
ceive a custody decree in one state. However, that decree did not
prevent the non-custodial parent from then abducting the child to an-
other state and relitigating the custody issue in that forum. Under the
Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws section 79,15 a state court
had the power to assert jurisdiction over custody disputes on several
grounds. These grounds were the physical presence of the child in the
new forum, the domicile of the child, or personal jurisdiction over
both parents. 16
In addition, "it was unclear whether a custody decree made in
one state was entitled to recognition and enforcement in other
states."' 17 Since custody decrees are modifiable based on changed cir-
cumstances, I8 it was relatively easy for a judge to find that changed
circumstances made it appropriate to modify the decree from a sister
state. Therefore, there was considerable uncertainty whether a cus-
tody decree granted in one state would be upheld in a sister state,
leading to confusion in this area of the law.
A primary concern in awarding custody is stability for the
child.' 9 This could lead to the ironic situation where the non-custo-
dial abducting parent is in a better situation after the abduction than
the custodial parent with the custody decree. This occurs if the ab-
ducting parent has retained custody for any length of time. The judge
would look to maintain the stability of the child, and this could be
shown by prolonged physical custody. 20 Therefore, the abducting
parent was rewarded for his actions.
13. UNIFORM CHILD CUSTODY JURISDICTION ACT AND COMMISSIONERS' PREFATORY
NOTE, 9 U.L.A. 111 (1979) [hereinafter UCCJA].
14. Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 653-64 (1982 & Supp. III 1985),
18 U.S.C. § 1073 (1982), 28 U.S.C. § 1738A (1982) [hereinafter PKPA].
15. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 79 (1971).
16. Id.
17. See Comment, supra note 5, at 419, citing S. KATZ, CHILD SNATCHING (1981).
18. See KATZ, supra note 7, at 56.
19. See UCCJA, supra note 13, Commissioner's Prefatory Note at 112.
20. Id. at 113.
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In May v. Anderson,21 the Supreme Court in a plurality decision
held that an Ohio court did not need to give full faith and credit to a
Wisconsin custody decree. In that case, the father obtained the de-
cree in an ex parte action in Wisconsin where the Wisconsin court had
no personal jurisdiction over the mother. The Court declined to an-
swer the question of when full faith and credit would or should be
given to a sister state's custody decree. 22 This decision had the result
of encouraging parents to use a self-help remedy. 23 In later cases, the
Court further limited granting full faith and credit to a custody decree
by holding that for a custody decree to receive full faith and credit in
a second state: (1) the first state had to be able to properly assert
jurisdiction and, (2) there could be no change in circumstances after
the decree that would warrant a change in custody.
24
Some states then turned to the legal principal of comity to re-
solve some of the resulting inconsistencies. Many of the states "have
used comity as their primary means of avoiding interstate disputes
and legal inconsistencies in child custody decrees."' 25 However, prior
to a state's enactment of the UCCJA, the decision of whether or not
to apply comity was in the trial judge's discretion.
26
A similar difficulty existed in the recognition of decrees from for-
eign sovereigns. Under the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws,
a court "should be free to disregard a decree when this is required by
the best interests of the child."' 27 In Hilton v. Guyot,28 the Supreme
21. 345 U.S. 528 (1953).
22. See Comment, supra note 5, at 420. See also Comment, Law and Treaty Responses to
International Child Abductions, 20 VA. J. INT'L L. 669, 673-77 (1980).
The Full Faith and Credit Clause of the U.S. Constitution mandates enforcement of
the valid judicial determinations of one state by other states. This constitutional doc-
trine, however, has never been deemed to apply to custody decrees. The U.S.
Supreme Court repeatedly has excluded child custody decrees from the ambit of the
full faith and credit mandate .... The basic rationale for exempting child custody
decrees from full faith and credit is that such decrees are never final judgments be-
cause they can be modified at any time, based on either changed circumstances or the
best interests of the child.
Id.
23. Comment, supra note 5, at 420.
24. See KATZ, supra note 7, at 56. See also, New York ex rel. Halvey v. Halvey, 330 U.S.
610 (1947); Kovacs v. Brewer, 356 U.S. 604 (1957). The Court stated "that the State of the
forum has at least as much leeway to disregard the judgment, to qualify it, or to depart from it
as does the State where it was rendered." Halvey, 330 U.S. at 615. In Kovacs, the Court stated
that "a custody decree is not resjudicata in [the new state] if changed circumstances call for a
different arrangement to protect the child's health and welfare." Kovacs, 356 U.S. at 608.
25. See KATZ, supra note 7, at 69.
26. Id.
27. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 103 comment b (1971). Section
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Court used that comity to recognize a foreign judgment where the
foreign jurisdiction provided an opportunity for a full and fair trial
with no prejudice or fraud. In those instances, the case should not be
retried in the United States courts.
However, in reality, the United States courts tended to relitigate
foreign custody decrees. 29 If a foreign parent attempted to enforce a
prior foreign decree against the abducting parent in the United States,
the foreign parent generally had to relitigate the entire custody suit on
its merits. 30 Also, the United States courts were reluctant to enforce
foreign decrees decided on principles different from the "best interests
of the child" standard adhered to in most United States jurisdic-
tions. 31 In those instances, the court would want to relitigate based
on the United States standard. Furthermore, this need to relitigate
applied to cases where a United States child was abducted to a foreign
79, comment b, reiterates the rationale that decrees remain subject to modification because of
changed circumstances.
28. 59 U.S. 113 (1895).
29. In State ex rel. Domico v. Domico, 153 W. Va. 695, 172 S.E.2d 805 (1970), the court
refused to enforce a West German decree awarding custody of the children to the mother after
the father took the children to the United States. The father had notice of the hearings. The
West Virginia court decided to relitigate, putting the West German mother, in the ironic posi-
tion of having to show "changed circumstances" to regain custody of her children. The end
result was that the father received custody of the children.
In Rzeszotarski v. Rzeszotarski, 296 A.2d 431 (D.C. 1972), a Polish father moved to the
United States and kept his son when he came for a visit. A Polish court awarded custody to
the mother. The District of Columbia court then granted the father a divorce and custody. On
appeal, the court held that the Polish decree was not controlling because the Polish court did
not have in personam jurisdiction over both parties (custody granted in ex parte proceeding).
Therefore, the standards of the Polish court did not meet the jurisdictional standards of the
District of Columbia court.
In Baranshamaje v. Baranshamaje, 7 Fam. L. Rep. (BNA) 2134 (D.C. Super. Ct. Nov. 26,
1980), the District of Columbia exercised its jurisdiction in relitigating a foreign custody de-
cree after claiming to have in personam jurisdiction over both parties. While the parents were
citizens of Burundi and had married there, they had spent their marriage domiciled in Vir-
ginia. However, a foreign court had already made a custody determination. In addition, the
child was not physically present in the District of Columbia's jurisdiction and was in fact living
in Burundi. Therefore, in this case, the court should have declined to accept jurisdiction. This
case illustrates the difficulty parents have had in having a foreign custody decree enforced in
the United States.
A minority of United States jurisdictions have chosen to enforce a foreign nation's cus-
tody decree. In the case of In re Lang, 9 A.D.2d 401, 193 N.Y.S.2d 763 (1959), the court
enforced a Swiss decree where the father had been awarded custody of the children in Switzer-
land. The mother abducted the children to the United States. The court held that the princi-
ple of comity provided a more rational way to determine custody.
30. See Comment, supra note 5, at 422.
31. Id. at 423.
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country.32
As the foregoing discussion indicates, a parent whose child was
abducted to a foreign country from the United States, or to the United
States from a foreign country, would be in the position of relitigating
in the country where the child was now present. The parent might
face less sympathetic courts, a possible language barrier and the addi-
tional expenses of traveling to a foreign forum and hiring local coun-
sel. In addition, the abducting parent could establish that the child
had been physically present in the new forum for a certain period of
time. Since an important factor for the child is stability, this physical
presence alone could satisfy the criteria for a "change in cir-
cumstances."
The end result was that the abducting parent had a strong moti-
vation to take a child and "forum shop" for a more sympathetic fo-
rum. The victimized parent would then have the burden of showing
that the child should be returned pursuant to a custody decree from a
sister state or a foreign nation. The various legislatures have re-
sponded to this dilemma at the state, national and international level,
and an attempt has been made to provide uniformity and stability in
the law on which parents can rely.
1. The Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act
The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws approved the UCCJA in 1968. 3 3 All fifty states have enacted
the UCCJA, along with the District of Columbia and the Virgin
Islands. 3
4
The UCCJA was designed to eliminate the advantages that ab-
ducting parents received by resorting to self-help.
Physical presence of the child in the jurisdiction opens the
doors of many courts to the petitioners and often assures him or
her of a decision in his or her favor. It is not surprising then that
custody claimants tend to take the law into their own hands. They
resort to self-help in the form of child stealing, kidnapping, or vari-
ous other schemes to gain possession of the child.3 5
Another goal of the UCCJA was to provide greater certainty in
32. Id.
33. See UCCJA, supra note 13, at 111.
34. See Comment, supra note 5, at 429.
35. See UCCJA, supra note 13, at 113.
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child custody awards. 36 Section 1 provides that the purposes of the
UCCJA are (1) to avoid jurisdictional conflicts between courts of dif-
ferent states and (2) to promote cooperation so that a custody decree
is rendered in the state which can best make a decision in the best
interests of the child. 37 Other purposes include deterring abductions,
avoiding relitigation and facilitating the enforcement of custody de-
crees from other states.
38
Jurisdiction is predicated on a "home state" basis. 39 The first
court has jurisdiction to render a custody determination if the state is
the home state, or if the state has a significant connection with the
child. Additionally, a court may exercise jurisdiction if there is an
emergency, or if no other state appears to have jurisdiction. 40 Only an
emergency situation or the probability that no other state has jurisdic-
tion permits the state to assert jurisdiction based solely on the child's
physical presence in the state, or on the physical presence of the child
and one of the contestants.41 Moreover, the physical presence of the
child in the state, while desirable, is not a prerequisite for the court to
make a custody determination. 42 This allows a victimized parent to
bring suit in the home state even if the child is no longer there.
Under sections 4 and 5 of the UCCJA notice must be given to the
contestants. 43 Notice of the action to a contestant outside the state
may be by personal service, by mail, or as ordered by the court.
44
Section 6 disallows concurrent proceedings. The second state
shall not exercise its jurisdiction if there is a pending proceeding in
the first state, unless the first state issues a stay because the second
state is the more appropriate forum.45 Additionally, a court has the
duty to consult the child custody registry, established under section
16, to determine if there are pending hearings in another state.
46
"Courts are expected to take an active part ... in seeking out infor-
mation about custody proceedings concerning the same child pending
36. Id.
37. Id. §§ l(a)(1), (2).
A8 Id- §§ 1(a)(5)-(7).
39. See infra note 126, PKPA definition of home state. The UCCJA and the PKPA use
the identical definition for home state.
40. See UCCJA, supra note 13, § 3(a)(l)-(4).
41. Id. § 3(b).
42. Id. § 3(c).
43. Id. §§ 4-5.
44. Id. § 4.
45. Id. § 6(a).
46. Id. § 6(b).
1988]
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in other states. In a proper case, jurisdiction is yielded to the other
state either under this section or under section 7. Both sections must
be read together.
'47
In addition, a court may decline to exercise its proper jurisdic-
tion if it determines that another court is the more appropriate fo-
rum.48 The court may look at factors such as whether another state
was recently the child's home state, has a closer connection with the
child, his family or the contestants, if substantial evidence concerning
the child is more available in another state, and, generally, if the exer-
cise of jurisdiction would go against the purposes of the UCCJA.
49
Section 7 follows the terminology used in the Restatement (Second) of
Conflict of Laws section 84,50 and is designed, like section 6, to pro-
mote judicial communication and cooperation. 5'
The "clean hands" principle is extended to cases where a custody
decree has not yet been issued under section 8(a).5 2 Under this sec-
tion, the court may decline to exercise its jurisdiction for an initial
decree if the petitioner has wrongfully taken the child from another
state.53 Additionally, a second court shall not exercise its jurisdiction
to modify a custody decree if the petitioner has wrongfully removed
the child from another state or improperly retained the child.54 If the
petitioner has violated any other provision of a custody decree, the
court may decline to exercise jurisdiction.
55
Section 12 provides that a custody decree rendered by a court
which had jurisdiction under section 3 is binding on all parties who
had service or notice:5 6 "[s]ince a custody decree is normally subject
to modification in the interest of the child, it does not have absolute
finality, but as long as it has not been modified, it is as binding as a
final judgment.
'5 7
Section 13 provides that custody decrees of sister states will be
47. Id. at Commissioner's Note to UCCJA § 6 at 134-35.
48. See UCCJA, supra note 13, § 7(a).
49. Id. § 7(c).
50. Id. at Commissioner's Note to UCCJA § 7 at 139.
51. Id.
52. See UCCJA, supra note 13, § 8(a).
53. Id.
54. Id. § 8(b).
55. Id. For example, this can occur if the custodial parent removes the child from the
state to frustrate the non-custodial parent's visitation rights. See Commissioner's Notes to § 8
at 143.
56. Id. § 12.
57. Id. at Commissioner's Note to § 12 at 150.
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recognized and enforced. 58 Section 14 only allows a subsequent state
to modify a custody decree from a prior state if it appears that the first
state no longer has jurisdiction under the UCCJA, or has declined to
exercise jurisdiction. 59 If a state has jurisdiction to modify, it must
give consideration to records of the prior proceedings. 60 Section 14 (a)
mandates that a court must give recognition to a previous court's
ongoing jurisdiction. 61 Under section 15, a certified copy of the cus-
tody decree from the first state may be filed in another state, and it
will be treated as if it had been rendered by that state. 62
Pursuant to section 22, a subsequent state is required to take a
more active role in its exercise of jurisdiction. 63 The court shall re-
quest the transcripts of court records and documents from the previ-
ous state in order to use as much prior evidence as is available in a
subsequent custody modification. 64
Section 23 extends the UCCJA to the international arena. If rea-
sonable notice and an opportunity to be heard is given to the affected
parties, the UCCJA will apply to "custody decrees and decrees in-
volving legal institutions similar in nature to custody institutions ren-
dered by appropriate authorities of other nations . "65 This section
is an application of the Lang case,66 where a minority of jurisdictions
have enforced foreign custody decrees.
Further, section 23 provides that when a child is brought into a
state:
the UCCJA may serve as the basis for enforcing a foreign court
order. However, when children are removed from the United
States, it is less likely that a state order from an American court
will be recognized and enforced abroad. Attorneys are left to dis-
cover the laws and procedures applicable to the recognition and
enforcement of foreign custody orders in effect in the foreign na-
tion and to proceed accordingly. 67
Several United States state and federal courts have had the opportu-
58. Id. § 13.
59. Id. § 14(a).
60. Id. § 14(b).
61. Id. § 14(a).
62. Id. § 15(a).
63. Id. § 22.
64. Id.
65. Id. § 23.
66. See supra note 29.
67. P. HOFF, INTERSTATE AND INTERNATIONAL CHILD CUSTODY DISPUTES 13 (1981).
19881
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nity to construe the international provision of the UCCJA.68 As the
following cases indicate, the general response has been to uphold a
custody decree issued by a foreign nation.
In Taylor v. Taylor,69 a Pennsylvania Superior Court held that a
child custody decree from a court in Ontario, Canada was valid and
entitled to recognition and enforcement under the international provi-
sion of the UCCJA. The parents were both Canadian citizens, mar-
ried in Canada, and the children were born in the United States. The
mother initiated divorce and custody proceedings in Ontario, Canada
and the father, who lived in Canada at the time, was personally
served, appeared and defended the action. The mother received a
temporary custody order in 1975 and a final decree in March of 1977.
During this period, the parents physically moved the children be-
tween the United States and Canada. When the mother received the
final custody decree in 1977, the children were living with the father
in Pennsylvania. The mother began an action in the Pennsylvania
courts, where her Ontario court decree was held to be entitled to rec-
ognition and enforcement. The children were then returned to their
mother in July of 1978. 70 In August of 1978, the father filed for cus-
tody of the children on the grounds that changed circumstances had
occurred in the year following the entry of the Pennsylvania order.
7'
The Taylor court cited a case that the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court had decided a few months earlier, Commonwealth ex rel. Zaubi
v. Zaubi.72 In Zaubi, the court held that:
[t]he UCCJA compels that Pennsylvania courts not only recognize
proper custody decrees from foreign nations, as the lower court
admits, but also that they decline to accept jurisdiction to modify
custody decrees in the absence of the showing of conditions in the
custodial household that are physically or emotionally harmful to
the children. Where, as here, the only changed condition is that
the children have been abducted from the jurisdiction issuing a
valid custody decree, the UCCJA clearly intends that our courts
enforce the foreign decree. 73
In an instance where an abducting parent takes a child from a forum
that issues a valid custody decree, under the international provisions
68. See UCCJA, supra note 13, § 23.
69. Taylor v. Taylor, 278 Pa. Super. 339, 420 A.2d 570 (1980).
70. Id. at 341, 420 A.2d at 571.
71. Id.
72. 492 Pa. 183, 423 A.2d 333 (1980).
73. Taylor, 278 Pa. Super. at 341, 420 A.2d at 571.
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of the UCCJA, that parent will have a heavy burden to prove that
"the court issuing the original decree was not acting in the child's best
interest. ' ' 74 Therefore, in this case, Pennsylvania was an inconvenient
forum. The Court of Ontario had jurisdiction and its custody decree
was resjudicata and had binding force in Pennsylvania.
A similar result occurred in the previously quoted case of Com-
monwealth ex rel. Zaubi v. Zaubi.71 In that case, the mother, a Dan-
ish citizen, was granted custody of her children in Denmark on June
16, 1977. The father was present at all times and was represented by
counsel. The father filed a final appeal in Denmark which was to be
heard on November 17, 1977. While the father had visitation rights
in August of 1977, he abducted the children to the United States. The
father concealed the children's whereabouts until May of 1978.
At that time, the mother filed suit in the Court of Common Pleas
of Greene County, Pennsylvania to obtain enforcement of the Danish
custody decree. 76 The father again fled with the children, returning
only after a contempt citation was issued against his parents.77 The
Court of Common Pleas held that the father had shown sufficient
changed circumstances to require a change of custody. 78 However,
the Superior Court held that the Court of Common Pleas had erred in
refusing to defer to the Danish courts, where the factual issues had
been previously litigated and resolved against the father.79 This hold-
ing was affirmed by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. 80
The court stated that a prime purpose of the UCCJA was to de-
ter "abductions and other unilateral removals of children undertaken
to obtain custody awards."' 81 As codified in Pennsylvania,82 the
UCCJA provides that, as a general rule, a court shall not exercise its
jurisdiction to modify a custody decree of another state if the peti-
tioner has wrongfully removed or improperly retained a child after a
visit. 83 However, the court may exercise jurisdiction if it is in the
best interests of the child. To avail himself of this section, a petitioner
would have to show that conditions in the custodial household were
74. Id.
75. Zaubi, 492 Pa. 183, 423 A.2d 333 (1980).
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 188, 423 A.2d at 336.
79. Id. at 188-89, 423 A.2d at 336.
80. Id. at 189, 423 A.2d at 337.
81. Id. at 187, 423 A.2d at 335.
82. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5349(b) (Purdon 1981).
83. Zaubi, 492 Pa. at 187, 423 A.2d at 335.
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physically or emotionally harmful to the child.84 The Supreme Court
of Pennsylvania held that the father had not met this burden. 85
In a dissenting opinion, Justice Nix relied on pre-UCCJA cases
which limited the full faith and credit clause in child custody mat-
ters. 86 In a concurring opinion, Justice Larsen reiterated that the ma-
jority opinion recognized the legislative judgment that "greater
finality in custody decrees is in the best interest of the child. '87
The Third District Court of Appeals of Florida has had two oc-
casions to construe the international provisions of the UCCJA.88 In
Brown v. Tan, the minor child was a resident and citizen of the Re-
public of Singapore, where he had continuously resided with his fa-
ther from birth. The child's mother had left Singapore in 1974, and
the father had retained custody of the child in Singapore. The mother
received a final judgment for dissolution of the marriage in Florida.
In December of 1980, the mother and her new father wrongfully re-
tained the child while he was visiting them in Florida.89
The court held that there was no reason to exercise its emergency
jurisdiction as there was simply no evidence of abuse or neglect by the
father.90 There was also no showing that a Singapore court lacked or
had declined to exercise its jurisdiction.91 In addition, the mother
produced no proof that a change in the living arrangements would be
in the best interests of the child.92
Moreover, no "significant connection" existed with Florida, be-
cause "physical presence in the state of the child, or of the child and
one of the contestants, is not alone sufficient to confer jurisdiction on
a court of this state to make a child custody determination. ' 93 Fur-
thermore, the court held that they may decline jurisdiction by reason
of the parent's wrongful conduct. 94 The final result was that the trial
court was without jurisdiction to determine the child's custody, and
by a writ of habeas corpus, ordered the child returned to the father to
84. Id. at 188, 423 A.2d at 336.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 204-05, 423 A.2d at 344-45.
87. Id. at 191, 423 A.2d at 337 (emphasis in the original).
88. Brown v. Tan, 395 So. 2d 1249 (3d Dist. 1981) and Al-Fassi v. AI-Fassi, 433 So. 2d
664 (3d Dist. 1983).








restore the status quo.95
A contrary result occurred in A 1-Fassi v. A l-Fassi,96 where a Flor-
ida court held that they were not required to recognize a Bahamian
custody decree. The court also held that they had the jurisdiction to
modify that decree.97 On February 24, 1982, the mother received a
temporary custody order in California. One day later, the father took
the children to the Bahamas. On March 1, 1982, the Supreme Court
of the Commonwealth heard the mother's petition for enforcement of
the California decree. 98 The court awarded custody to the father on
the grounds that the mother had misled the California court on the
issue of whether California was the home of the parties.99 Addition-
ally, the court held that the "natural surroundings of these minors is
[sic] at the Royal Palace at Jeddah, or in an enclave when outside of
Saudi Arabia."' °
The father left the Bahamas for Florida almost immediately after
the Bahamian decree was entered, and he never returned.' 0' Subse-
quently, the California courts declined to exercise jurisdiction because
Florida would be a more convenient forum. 0 2 The mother then filed
in Dade County, Florida for an amended petition to set aside or mod-
ify the Bahamian decree. 10 3  The trial court upheld the Bahamian
decree.
In reversing the trial court, the Court of Appeal relied on several
factors. Under Florida law, the UCCJA does not require that a for-
eign nation custody decree be recognized. 1" 4 However, if reasonable
notice and an opportunity to be heard have been given by the foreign
tribunal, the provisions of the UCCJA can be applied to a foreign
nation's decree. 105
The Bahamian court's inquiry did not provide that "reasonable
notice and an opportunity to be heard" be given since the father and
children never appeared in court. 10 6 Though the mother appeared,
95. Id.
96. AI-Fassi v. AI-Fassi, 433 So. 2d 664 (3d Dist. 1983).
97. Id. at 668.
98. Id. at 665.
99. Id.
100. Id.
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she was never examined. Since the only pleading before the court was
the mother's petition for enforcement of the California temporary or-
der, no full hearing took place. Therefore, the court held that there
was no reasonable notice or opportunity to be heard. 107
In addition, the Bahamian court rested its jurisdiction solely on
the children's physical presence in the Bahamas; the physical presence
was temporary, and solely for the purpose of obtaining a favorable
custody ruling. 108 There was no showing of any of the exceptions al-
lowing a court to exercise its jurisdiction, such as abuse of the child,
no other state having jurisdiction, or another state declining to exer-
cise its jurisdiction. 109
The court held that, under Florida law, a court cannot exercise
its jurisdiction to modify a custody decree if the non-custodial parent
has improperly removed the child from the custodial parent unless it
is in the best interests of the child. 110 Therefore, the court could not
exercise jurisdiction because the children were wrongfully removed
under a valid California temporary custody order. Finally, the court
found that "the principles of comity do not require recognition since
the decree is offensive to a public policy of our state, i.e., that a cus-
tody decision be based upon the best interests and welfare of the mi-
nor children."111
In the end, however, the court declined to resolve the issue on
the challenge to the Florida court order which recognized the Baha-
mian judgment. Instead, the court resolved the issue on the ground
that even if the Bahamian decree was entitled to recognition, the Flor-
ida court had jurisdiction to modify the decree because the Bahamian
court had no jurisdiction over the parties or subject matter pursuant
to the UCCJA standard. 112 Therefore, the Florida court was able to
properly exercise its jurisdiction.
Virginia has subsequently construed two international child cus-
tody disputes. In Middleton v. Middleton, 113 the parents were married
in England and moved to Virginia where the children were born. In
1974, the mother returned to England with the children and, in 1977,
the father was granted a divorce. Custody was granted to the mother
107. Id.
108. Id. at 667.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 668.
112. Id.
113. 314 S.E.2d 362 (1984).
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in England, subject to reasonable visitation by the father. In 1981, the
father, while exercising his visitation rights, instituted change of cus-
tody proceedings unbeknownst to the mother. After the mother re-
ceived notice, she came to Virginia and took the children back to
England.
The Supreme Court of Virginia held that it was proper for the
trial court to decline to exercise jurisdiction, using the best interests of
the child standard, and found that England was the children's home
state. 114 The court also held that "we are not reluctant to endorse an
international deferral to the courts of England because 'Virginia's ju-
risprudence is deeply rooted in the ancient precedents, procedures,
and practices of the English system of justice.' ",15
In Middleton v. Middleton,' 6 the court concurrently decided a
second international case. The Lyon couple married in Virginia. The
mother, an English citizen, later took the child to England without
the father's knowledge. The mother received interim care and cus-
tody of the child in England. The father filed in Virginia for the re-
turn of the child, but the court, on August 30, granted comity to the
English order. The trial court entered the order on September 23. On
December 20, the English High Court granted the mother custody." 
7
The Supreme Court of Virginia held that Virginia had been the
home state of the minor child. The court held that if the trial court
had exercised its jurisdiction on September 23, the English court
might have deferred to the Virginia court and not adjudicated the
custody issue in March. The court reversed the September 23 order
denying jurisdiction, instructing the trial court upon remand to exer-
cise jurisdiction and to enter orders that would enable it to adjudicate
the custody dispute." 8
The court held that:
at least two important purposes of the UCCJA [are] applicable
here: to deter unilateral removal of children to obtain foreign cus-
tody awards, and to assure that litigation over the child's custody
occurs in the forum where the child and his family have the closest
connection .... [T]he child had no conceivable connection with
England on April 30 except for his forced physical presence there
... .His present and future custody should be decided in
114. Id. at 368.
115. Id. (quoting Oehl v. Oehl, 221 Va. 618, 623, 272 S.E.2d 441, 444 (1980)).
116. 227 Va. 82, 314 S.E.2d 362 (1984).
117. Id. at 366.
118. Id. at 371.
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Virginia.119
The foregoing line of cases indicates that the courts will construe
foreign custody decrees in order to uphold the stated goals of the
UCCJA. Foreign custody decrees decided under the United States
standard, best interests of the child, will generally be enforced in the
United States. Therefore, a parent whose child is abducted to the
United States from abroad will have the protection of section 23 in
attempting to enforce a foreign custody decree. In addition, the
UCCJA provides a measure of protection for custodial parents in the
United States. The wrongdoing parent will not be rewarded for his or
her actions, as a custody decree will generally be upheld in another
state in the United States.
When the United States courts have construed foreign custody
decrees, the decrees have generally been enforced if they were decided
with reasonable notice and an opportunity to be heard and based on a
standard approximating the best interests of the child. Therefore,
children abducted to the United States from a foreign country where a
valid custody decree is in effect have a good chance of being returned
to that country. However, this result only emphasizes the need for
the adoption of the Hague Convention. The Hague Convention
would dictate this result even in the absence of a valid foreign custody
decree, and would provide a similar result for an American child ab-
ducted abroad.
2. The Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act
The Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act (PKPA) 20 was
adopted in 1980 to provide a uniform federal response to child abduc-
tion. At that time, not all of the states had adopted the UCCJA; ha-
ven states remained available for child abductors, where it was still
possible that a prior custody decree would not be enforced.
The congressional findings' 2' showed a large and growing
number of custody and visitation disputes in different states with
often inconsistent and conflicting results. 22 This led to a:
tendency of parties involved in such disputes to frequently resort to
the seizure, restraint, concealment, and interstate transportation of
119. Id.
120. See PKPA, supra note 14.
121. Id. at 28 U.S.C. § 1738A, Congressional Findings and Declaration of Purposes for
Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act of 1980.
122. Id. § 7(a)(1), (2).
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children, the disregard of court orders, excessive relitigation of
cases, obtaining of conflicting orders by the courts of various juris-
dictions, and interstate travel and communication that is so expen-
sive and time consuming as to disrupt their occupations and
commercial activities.'
23
Congress found that states frequently failed to give full faith and
credit to the findings of other jurisdictions.124
The PKPA is a mandate to state courts to give full faith and
credit to a prior court's custody decree if the first court has made the
determination consistently with the provisions of the statute. 25 To
fall within the parameters of this statute, the first court has to have
jurisdiction and meet one of the following conditions: the state has
been the child's home state1 26 for six months preceding the action, or
the child was only absent from the home state because of the wrongful
removal or retention by one of the contestants. 27
A second state has jurisdiction if no other state appears to have
jurisdiction and the second state has a significant connection with at
least one of the contestants.128 There must be substantial evidence in
the second state concerning the child's needs. 29 Other conditions
that give a second state jurisdiction are where: (1) the child has been
abandoned or is in danger of abuse, 130 (2) no other state has jurisdic-
tion or that state has declined to exercise it on the grounds that the
subsequent state is a more appropriate forum,' 31 or (3) the court has
continuing jurisdiction. 32
Therefore, the first court is able to make a valid custody decree if
one of the above conditions is met. A subsequent court can modify
the decree only if it has jurisdiction and the first state no longer has
123. Id. § 7(a)(3).
124. Id. § 7(a)(4).
125. See PKPA, supra note 14, § 1738A(a).
126. "Home State" is defined as:
the State in which, immediately preceding the time involved, the child lived with his
parents, a parent or a person acting as a parent, for at least six consecutive months,
and in the case of a child less than six months old, the State in which the child lived
from birth with any of such persons. Periods of temporary absence of any of such
persons are counted as part of the six-month or other period.
PKPA, supra note 14, § 1738A(b)(4).
127. See PKPA, supra note 14, § 1738A(c)(2)(A)(ii).
128. Id. § 1738A(c)(2)(B).
129. Id.
130. Id. § 1738A(c)(2)(C).
131. Id. § 1738A(c)(2)(D).
132. Id. § 1738A(c)(2)(E).
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jurisdiction or has declined to exercise jurisdiction. 1 3 3 The subsequent
court may not exercise jurisdiction if a previous court has jurisdiction
consistent with the provisions of this Act.1
34
Although no express statement gives full faith and credit to for-
eign decrees, the PKPA does not conflict with section 23, the interna-
tional provision of the UCCJA. 135 Therefore, court decisions
construing section 23 of the UCCJA should be valid and not subject
to preemption by the PKPA.
A second major provision of the PKPA established the Parent
Locator Service. 136 The law authorizes the Federal Parent Locator
Service (FPLS) "to locate children, or individuals who have taken
children in violation of a court custody order, or for the purpose of
enforcing any State or Federal law related to the illegal taking or re-
straint of a child."1 37 States which choose to participate must enter
into an agreement with the Secretary of Health and Human Serv-
ices. 138 This service is then able to access the records of Social Secur-
ity, the Internal Revenue Service, and the Department of Defense to
track down the child or the abductor.
A third provision states that the unlawful flight statute139 applies
to cases of interstate and/or international flight in parental kidnap-
ping cases. 140 This gives the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)
jurisdiction to assist state law enforcement agencies in locating and
apprehending fugitives from state justice.1 41 A state law enforcement
agency must request FBI involvement. Prior to December 23, 1983,
the Criminal Division of the Department of Justice had invoked a
standard that there must be "independent, credible information that
the victim child was in physical danger or was then in a condition of
abuse or neglect."'' 42 However, this guideline was eliminated on De-
133. Id. § 1738A(f)(1)-(2).
134. Id. § 1738A(g).
135. See Comment, supra note 5, at 433-34.
136. 42 U.S.C. § 653 (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
137. Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Juvenile Justice of the Committee on the Judici-
ary to Examine Available and Proposed Means to Resolve the Cases of Interstate and Interna-
tional Parental Kidnapping, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 31 (1983) (statement of Fred Schutzman,
Deputy Director, Office of Child Support Enforcement, U.S. Department of Health and
Human Services) [hereinafter Juvenile Justice].
138. Id.
139. 18 U.S.C. § 1073 (1982).
140. See Juvenile Justice, supra note 137, at 9 (Prepared Statement of Lawrence Lippe,
Chief, General Litigation Section, Crim. Division, U.S. Dep't of Just.).
141. Id.
142. Id. at 11-13.
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cember 23, 1983 and parental kidnapping felonies are now handled
the same as other fugitive felonies. 143
B. The State Department's Bureau of Consular Affairs
The Bureau of Consular Affairs is often approached in an at-
tempt to resolve international child abductions.144 Between the pe-
riod of April 1982 and January 1983, 333 new child custody cases
came to the attention of the State Department, making a total of 677
open child custody cases.' 45 As of December 31, 1986, the State De-
partment knew of 2,353 cases of unresolved child abductions from the
United States.1 46 However, the Department is limited in the assist-
ance it can render to United States citizens. The Department cannot:
(1) provide legal advice; (2) take custody of a child; (3) force a child to
return to the United States; or (4) influence child custody proceedings
in a foreign state. 47
Despite these limitations, the State Department is able to provide
some aid to victimized parents in locating their children. The Depart-
ment can: (1) assist parents in locating children abroad; (2) report on
the child's welfare; (3) provide lists of foreign attorneys; (4) furnish
general information on laws and procedures which might aid in the
return of the child; (5) alert foreign authorities if it appears that the
child is being abused or neglected; and (6) impose passport controls in
appropriate cases. 148
The State Department's Office of Passport Services is also limited
in resolving child custody disputes. No assistance can be given by
United States authorities to a child with dual nationality if the child
has a passport from the country of its other nationality and the child
is located in that country. 49 In addition, once a child has been issued
a passport and is then taken abroad, the case will often have to be
litigated in the foreign country where the abducting parent's custody
is recognized. 50
As the UCCJA and PKPA show, recourse is often available to
143. Id. at 13.
144. See Juvenile Justice, supra note 137, at 40 (Prepared Statement of James G. Hergen,
Assistant Legal Advisor for Consular Affairs, Off. of the Legal Advisor, U.S. Dep't of State).
145. Id. at 41.
146. Letter, supra note 2.
147. See Juvenile Justice, supra note 137, at 42 (Prepared Statement of James G. Hergen,
Assistant Legal Advisor for Consular Affairs, Off. of the Legal Advisor, U.S. Dep't of State).
148. Id.
149. Id. at 44.
150. Id.
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parents whose children have been abducted to the United States. The
law mandates that in instances where a decree was issued pursuant to
the best interest of the child standard, the child will usually be re-
turned pursuant to this custody decree. When children are taken
abroad from the United States, however, the victimized parent will
generally be forced to litigate in the foreign forum. These concerns
have led to a response at the international level.
III. INTERNATIONAL RESPONSES
A. The Strasbourg Convention
The Strasbourg Convention 151 was opened for signature on May
20, 1980.152 As of 1982, the Strasbourg Convention had been signed
by fifteen nations, but had been ratified only by France. 15 3 The Stras-
bourg Convention is open only to members of the Council of Europe,
which is composed of twenty-one European nations.154 The goals of
the Convention are the "welfare of the child ... in reaching decisions
concerning his custody"'155 and to "ensure that decisions concerning
the custody of a child can be more widely recognized and en-
forced."' 156 The Convention was written to provide recourse for a per-
son with an enforceable custody decree when a child is wrongfully
removed or retained across an international border. 15 7
The Convention provides for the appointment of a Central Au-
thority to carry out the Convention's functions and to provide for
cooperation between the Contracting States. 58 The Central Author-
ity shall take necessary steps to locate the child and to "secure the
delivery of the child to the applicant where enforcement is
granted."' 59 Article 7 provides that an enforceable custody decision
in a Contracting State shall be enforceable in every other Contracting
State. 160
151. See Strasbourg Convention, supra note 11.
152. Id.
153. See Comment, supra note 5, at 436-37. Under Art. 22(1) of the Strasbourg Conven-
tion, it becomes effective after three members of the Council of Europe ratify it.
154. See Crouch, infra note 172, at 594. Hungary, who was not a party to the Conven-
tion, has acceded to it. The United States will need to expressly accept Hungary's accession
for it to become binding between the United States and Hungary. See infra note 179.
155. See Strasbourg Convention, supra note 11, at 23 (preamble).
156. Id.
157. Id. art. 1.
158. Id. arts. 2-3.
159. Id. art. 5(1)(a), (d).
160. Id. art. 7.
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Under Article 8, the Central Authority shall restore the custody
of the child if, when the custody order was issued, the child and his or
her parents had sole nationality in that state and the child had his or
her habitual residence there. 16' Therefore, the Convention does not
apply to children of dual nationality. In addition, the request for res-
toration must be made within six months of the improper removal. 162
Additionally, under Article 9, if an application has been made to
the Central Authority within six months of the removal, recognition
and enforcement may be refused if the defendant was not served, and
failure of service was not based on the defendant's deliberate conceal-
ment of himself. 16 3 Refusal is also permitted if a decision was ex parte
and the authority's jurisdiction was not founded on the habitual resi-
dence of the defendant or the child. 164 Finally, refusal is permissible if
the decree is incompatible with the decisions of the requested State. 165
Additional areas for refusal are provided in Article 10 where
there has not been improper removal or application was made over six
months after improper removal. These include the grounds that "the
effects of the decision are manifestly incompatible with the fundamen-
tal principles of the law ... ",166 or that the passage of time has cre-
ated a change in circumstances such that the "effects of the original
decision are . . . no longer in accordance with the welfare of the
child."' 167 Article 10 also provides that refusal can be based on a child
having more significant connections with the requested State than
with the State of origin.168
Under Article 17 a Contracting State may make a reservation
that cases covered by Articles 8 and 9 may be refused on the grounds
provided in Article 10.169 Therefore, in addition to the discretion
granted judges in Article 10, Article 17 potentially provides more
discretion.
Where no custody decree exists, under Article 12, a parent can
obtain a post-removal decree in the pre-removal state. 170 A Con-
tracting State, however, can make a reservation not to be bound by
161. Id. art. 8(l)(a).
162. Id. art. 8(1)(b).
163. Id. art. 9(1)(a).
164. Id. art. 9(1)(b)(i), (iii).
165. Id. art. 9(1)(c).
166. Id. art. 1O(1)(a).
167. Id. art. 1O(l)(b).
168. Id. art. 1O(l)(c).
169. Id. art. 17(1).
170. Id. art. 12.
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Article 12.171
The Strasbourg Convention tries to provide "swift, summary and
inexpensive return of children"1 72 even though it bases this on recog-
nition and enforcement of a court decree.' 73 However, it is limited
since it applies only to European Contracting States and potentially
allows a judge to exercise discretion in numerous exceptions to the
swift return of the child.
B. The Hague Convention
In January 1976, a suggestion was made at a Special Commission
of the Hague Conference on Private International Law that the sub-
ject of child abduction be placed on the agenda at the Conference.
174
This led to a preliminary draft of a Convention to curb international
child snatching, prepared by the Special Commission.175 Twenty-
three nations, including the United States, worked together to pro-
duce this draft. 176 This draft was presented at the Fourteenth Session
of the Hague Conference in October 1980, and on October 25, 1980,
four of the twenty-eight represented nations signed the Convention on
the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction. 177 The United
States signed the Convention on December 23, 1981.178 As of late
June 1987, the Convention has been ratified by France, Portugal,
Canada, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, Australia, Luxembourg,
and Spain, and has been acceded to by Hungary.
179
The Hague Convention is "designed to secure the prompt return
of children who have been abducted from, or retained outside of, their
country of habitual residence, and to facilitate the exercise of visita-
tion across international borders."' 180 There is no pre-condition of a
custody decree in favor of the left-behind parent for the return of a
171. Id. art. 18.
172. Crouch, Effective Measures Against International Child Snatching, 131 NEw L.J.
592, 594 (1981) [hereinafter Crouch].
173. Id.
174. Anton, The Hague Convention on International Child Abduction, 30 INT'L & COMP.
L.Q. 537, 539 (1981) [hereinafter Anton].
175. Bodenheimer, The Hague Draft Convention on International Child Abduction, 4 FAM.
L.Q. 99 (1980).
176. Id.
177. See Anton, supra note 174, at 539-40. The nations were France, Greece, Canada and
Switzerland.
178. See Comment, supra note 5, at 440.
179. Telephone interview with Peter Pfund, Ass't Legal Adviser for Private Int'l Law,
U.S. Dep't of State (June 24, 1987).
180. See Rovine, supra note 10, at 13.
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child, nor does the Convention seek to settle disputes arising over
legal custody rights.18' The Convention would place the country
where a child has been wrongfully removed or retained under a treaty
obligation to return the child, provide a clear-cut procedure for the
return and deter such conduct by a restoration of the legal and factual
status quo in effect before the wrongful removal or retention. 8 2
The objectives of the Convention are to secure the prompt return
of the wrongfully removed or retained child and to ensure that cus-
tody and visitation rights are respected by Contracting States. 8 3 Re-
moval or retention is wrongful when it is in breach of custody rights
held by any person of the State where the child was habitually resi-
dent before the removal or retention. These rights may be awarded by
judicial decision, be based on agreement, or arise by operation of
law.' 84 This is in contrast to the Strasbourg Convention, where
wrongful removal is predicated on a custody decision which has been
given in a Contracting State. 8 5
Under the Convention, each Contracting State must designate a
Central Authority to perform the procedural duties, with a goal of
cooperation among the Contracting States.' 8 6 Article 8 allows any
person to apply to the Central Authority of the child's habitual resi-
dence or to any other Central Authority for assistance in seeking the
return of the child.8 7 Article 29 allows the applicant to petition judi-
cial or administrative authorities directly for the return of the child. 18 8
These remedies are not mutually exclusive and the applicant may in-
voke either or both of them.8 9 Pursuant to Article 10, the Central
Authority of the state where the child is physically present has a duty
to take appropriate measures to provide for the voluntary return of
the child. 1 90 It is anticipated that the proceedings for return could be
completed in six weeks. 91
181. Id.
182. See Mochary, supra note 1, at 10.
183. See Hague Convention, supra note 12, art. 1.
184. Id. art. 3.
185. See Strasbourg Convention, supra note 11, art. 1(d).
186. Id. arts. 6, 7. In the United States, the Department of State has volunteered to act as
the Central Authority. See Hergen, supra note 144, at 39.
187. See Hague Convention, supra note 12, art. 8.
188. Id. art. 29.
189. Legal Analysis of the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child
Abduction, 51 Fed. Reg. 58, 10503, 10507 (1986) [hereinafter Legal Analysis].
190. See Hague Convention, supra note 12, art. 10.
191. Id. art. 11.
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If proceedings have been commenced less than one year from the
date of removal or retention (as defined in Article 3), the judicial or
administrative authority of the Contracting State shall order the
child's return. 192 This provision is mandatory. If proceedings com-
mence over one year later, the child shall be returned unless it is
demonstrated that the child has settled into his new environment.1
93
Article 13 sets forth the exceptions to the obligation to return the
child. 94 These are: (1) the applicant was "not actually exercising the
custody rights at the time of removal or retention, or had consented to
or subsequently acquiesced in the removal or retention"; or (2) there
is risk of grave physical or psychological harm to the child. 95 If the
child is of sufficient age and maturity, the judicial or administrative
authority has the discretion to adhere to the child's wishes. 96 The
Convention only applies to children under the age of sixteen.
97
In addition, Article 20 provides another exception to the immedi-
ate return of the child. 98 Return of the child "may be refused if this
would not be permitted by the fundamental principles of the re-
quested State relating to the protection of human rights and funda-
mental freedoms."' 99
Article 16 expressly states that the authorities shall not decide
the merits of the custody issue until it is determined that the child is
not to be returned. 200 Article 18 empowers the judicial or administra-
tive authority to order the return of the child at any time.
20 1
As stated above, the applicability of the Strasbourg Convention is
limited, as it only applies to European Contracting States. However,
"it could be useful in securing return of a child through the Hague
Convention if a child has been taken from, say, the United States to
... Great Britain, which has membership in both Conventions, and
thence to a Strasbourg-only country such as Italy or West Ger-
many. '"202 In a case such as the above, it appears that Great Britain
192. Id. art. 12.
193. Id.
194. Id. art. 13.
195. Id. art. 13(a)-(b).
196. Id. art. 13.
197. Id. art. 4.
198. Id. art. 20.
199. Id. These exceptions were basically seen as compromises to differing viewpoints
among the delegates to the Convention. See Anton, supra note 174, at 550-51.
200. See Hague Convention, supra note 12, art. 16.
201. Id. art. 18.
202. See Crouch, supra note 172, at 594.
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could act as an intermediary for the United States in the return of the
child.
The Hague Convention presently provides the best remedy for
the, international abduction of children. The goal is to return children
in the shortest time possible, with the merits of the custody dispute
being litigated after the child returns home. In addition, there are
relatively few exceptions to the mandatory return of th child, thereby
helping to insure that the stated goals will be followed. While the
potential for abuse exists with the stated exceptions, the drafters had
to accommodate different social and legal systems and they appear to
have fashioned these potential conflicts into a workable model. Also,
as the Hague Convention follows the policies and goals of the UCCJA
and PKPA, it would seem to be consistent with United States laws
and precedent.
IV. THE AMERICAN RESPONSE To THE HAGUE CONVENTION
The Convention was transmitted to the United States Senate by
President Reagan on October 30, 1985.203 The President described
the Convention as "an important addition to the State and Federal
laws currently in effect in the United States [and that it] would signifi-
cantly improve the chances a parent . . . has of recovering a child
from a foreign Contracting State. ' ' 2°4 The President recommended
that the Senate give the Convention an early and favorable ratifica-
tion, subject to the reservations described by the Secretary of State. 20 5
Secretary of State George Shultz indicated several reservations.
First, all documents sent to the United States Central Authority in a
foreign language also should be accompanied by an English transla-
tion (referring to Article 24). Secondly, (referring to Article 26) the
United States will not provide for court costs or legal counsel incurred
with efforts to return children except as those costs are covered by a
legal aid program.2
0 6
The Convention is supported by the American Bar Association,
the Departments of Justice and Health and Human Services and
many states. 20 7 In addition, the Department of State has taken a
203. Letter of Submittal, Message from the President of the United States, reprinted in 51
Fed. Reg. 10,495 (1986).
204. Id.
205. Id.
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favorable position on the Convention:
International child abductions are a growing and intractable prob-
lem for the children, aggrieved parents, foreign ministries, consular
officials, courts and attorneys involved. The... Convention rep-
resents the best foreseeable opportunity for the United States to par-
ticipate in international legal and administrative arrangements to
deal with international child abductions. It would reduce the De-
partment's burden in dealing with aggrieved parents seeking the
return of children abducted from the United States.
20 8
On October 9, 1986, the United States Senate gave advice and
consent to United States ratification. 20 9 However, the State Depart-
ment did not plan to have the United States ratify until federal legisla-
tion entitled the "International Child Abduction Act" 210 had been
enacted by Congress.2 1' After a final review of the draft federal bill by
the Office of Management and Budget, it was expected that the bill
would be introduced in both Houses of Congress by request, as an
administrative bill, in late February or early March 1987.212 The
hope was that the bill would be enacted by both Houses of Congress
before summer 1987 recess so that the Convention would enter into
force for the United States in late summer or fall of 1987.213
This legislation was introduced into the Senate on June 9, 1987
under the sponsorship of Senator Simon. 21 4 It facilitates implementa-
tion of the Hague Convention by providing for the designation of a
federal agency to serve as the Central Authority for the United
States. 215 Additionally, the Central Authority is authorized to obtain
information from the FPLS in its attempts to locate abducted chil-
dren.216 State and federal courts will have concurrent original juris-
diction to hear actions arising under the Convention and this Act.
217
The Act further establishes that United States courts shall grant full
faith and credit to other courts in the United States which order the
208. See Hergen, supra note 144, at 48. (emphasis in the original).
209. Telephone interview with Peter Pfund, Ass't Legal Adviser for Private International
Law, Dep't of State (Jan. 1987).
210. International Child Abduction Act, reprinted in CONG. REC. S7,885-89 (1987) [here-
inafter Act].
211. Telephone interview with Peter Pfund, Ass't Legal Adviser for Private Int'l Law,
U.S. Dep't of State (Feb. 10, 1987).
212. Id.
213. Id.
214. See Act, supra note 210.
215. Id. § 105(a).
216. Id. § 105(d).
217. Id. § 102(a).
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return of children pursuant to the Convention and the Act. 21 8 Reme-
dies under both the Convention and the Act are in addition to reme-
dies available under state and other international agreements. 21 9 This
proposed legislation will smooth the way for left-behind parents to
contact the Central Authority and activate the mechanisms to have
their child returned.
V. ANALYSIS - A PRACTICAL APPLICATION
The following hypotheticals demonstrate how the Hague Con-
vention and the UCCJA would interact in certain situations.
In the first hypothetical, a child is abducted to the United States
from a Contracting State to the Hague Convention. Once the Hague
Convention goes into effect in the United States, the victimized parent
would have recourse under this treaty.
However, the victimized parent must first meet the threshold re-
quirements necessary under the Convention.220  First, the parent
must hold rights protected by the Convention. 221 The person, institu-
tion or other body who actually had custody prior to the abduction
has the responsibility of activating the return mechanisms. 222 Basi-
cally, this section applies to parents, but it could also apply to grand-
parents, foster parents or a legal guardian, depending on the situation
in a given case. The term "institution" would also seem to encompass
child care and adoption agencies.
Second, in addition to being the proper person to petition for
return of a child, the victimized parent (or institution) must also show
that the retention or removal was wrongful within the definition set
forth by the Convention. 223 The Convention recognizes that there can
be wrongful removal or retention even if the parents have joint cus-
tody of the child. 224 Wrongful removal or retention can be shown by
a breach of the custody rights, such as the abducting parent's failure
to return a child after the visitation period.
However, in the absence of a custody decree giving the petition-
ing parent legal rights, wrongful removal or retention would be deter-
mined according to the custody laws in effect in the country that was
218. Id. § 102(e).
219. Id. § 102(f).
220. See Hague Convention, supra note 12, art. 3.
221. See Legal Analysis, supra note 189, at 10,505.
222. See Hague Convention, supra note 12, art. 8.
223. See Legal Analysis, supra note 189, at 10,506.
224. See Hague Convention, supra note 12, art. 3.
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the child's habitual residence just prior to the wrongful actions.225
The United States' authorities would have to look to the laws of the
country of the child's habitual residence to determine if the removal
or retention was wrongful. If the foreign state had a presumption of
joint custody between the parents, the victimized parent would meet
the Convention's guidelines.226 Moreover, if the wrongdoing parent
prevented the victimized parent from seeing the child, this would also
be wrongful removal or retention pursuant to the Convention.
If a custody decree already exists, the Convention's language
does not mandate recognition and enforcement of that decree. In-
stead, the Convention simply seeks to return the parties to the factual
situation that existed prior to the wrongful removal or retention. 227
Once the child is returned to his or her country of habitual residence,
the parents are then free to litigate the custody order on its merits.
The Convention also applies to a private agreement between the
parties, so long as the agreement has a legal effect under the law of the
child's habitual residence. 228 Therefore, the victimized parent can pe-
tition for return of the child where there is a custody decree, a private
agreement, or the parent would have custody under the laws of the
foreign state.
Finally, the parent must show that he or she was actually exercis-
ing his or her custody rights at the time of the abduction. 229 Accord-
ing to the Perez-Vera Report, the Convention presumes that the
person caring for the child has custody.230 Therefore, this should be a
relatively easy standard for the parent to meet.
Once the person has shown that he or she is an appropriate per-
son to make a request for a child's return, he or she has recourse to
two systems under the Convention. He or she can directly contact the
Central Authority of the Contracting State of the child's habitual resi-
dence, or he or she can petition directly to the judicial authorities in
the Contracting State where the child has been taken. 231 In the
United States, the federal and state courts would have concurrent ju-
225. See Legal Analysis, supra note 189, at 10,506.
226. Id.
227. Id. at 10,505.
228. See Hague Convention, supra note 12, art. 3(b).
229. Id. art. 3(b).
230. Perez-Vera, Explanatory Report 426, 448 para. 73, reprinted in ACTES ET DOCU-
MENTS DE LA QUATORZIEME SESSION, TOME III, CHILD ABDUCTION (The Hague 1982)
[hereinafter Perez-Vera].
231. See Legal Analysis, supra note 189, at 10,507.
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risdiction to hear actions arising under the Convention.232 The left-
behind parent could go to federal or state court under the Conven-
tion. These remedies are not mutually exclusive, and an aggrieved
parent can activate both mechanisms. 233 The decision regarding what
action to take would depend upon the given situation, since the Cen-
tral Authority may attempt to arrange for voluntary return of the
child, whereas a judicial action would have more of an adversary ap-
proach. A judicial action might be more advantageous in that it may
encourage the wrongful parent to return the child.
If a parent contacts the Central Authority, the Central Authority
will activate administrative procedures to try to secure the voluntary
return of the child.234 The Central Authority will try to locate the
child, prevent harm to the child and, if necessary, help to provide
legal aid and institute judicial or administrative proceedings. 235 The
petitioning parent should give the Central Authority information con-
cerning the identity of the child, date of birth, name of alleged wrong-
doer, the grounds on which the claim for return is based and any
other relevant documents.
236
In addition, the parent can petition the judicial and administra-
tive authorities directly. 237 This can be done as a sole remedy, or in
conjunction with petition to the Central Authority.23 Under Article
11, the authorities of a Contracting State are required to act promptly
in a proceeding to return a child.239 The Convention states that if a
decision concerning return is not reached within six weeks, the appli-
cant or Central Authority is entitled to request a statement of reasons
for the delay.
240
If a parent is activating the Convention in the United States, the
United States will not pay any costs arising from the need for legal
advice or court costs, unless those costs are covered by legal aid foun-
dations.241 However, if return is ordered, the judicial authority may
order the wrongdoing parent to pay expenses incurred by the
232. See Act, supra note 210, at § 102(A).
233. See Legal Analysis, supra note 189, at 10,507.
234. See Hague Convention, supra note 12, art. 10.
235. Id. art. 7.
236. Id. art. 8. Also see recommended form in Legal Analysis, supra note 189, at 10,515.
237. See Legal Analysis, supra note 189, at 10,507.
238. Id.
239. See Hague Convention, supra note 12, art. 11.
240. Id.
241. Id. art. 26.
19881
Loy. L.A. Intl & Comp. L.J.
applicant.242
When proceedings begin within one year of the wrongful removal
or retention, the judicial authority shall order the child returned. 243
Under Article 17, the victimized parent is entitled to the child's re-
turn even if the alleged wrongdoing parent has received a new custody
decree in the foreign state (i.e. United States) where the child is now
located. 244 The Convention takes precedence over orders granted
before the court had notice of the wrongful removal or retention. 245
Thus, Article 17 prevents a wrongdoing parent from insulating the
child from a return order just by getting a custody order in the foreign
state.
The above analysis applies unless the child is over sixteen (and
then the Convention does not apply), the authority finds the applicant
was not actually exercising custody at the time of the retention or
removal, or the applicant had acquiesced in the removal or reten-
tion.246 Another exception to return of the child is if there is a risk of
grave physical or psychological harm to the child.247 In addition, the
judicial authority can consider the child's objection to return if the
child is of sufficient age and maturity level.248
Under Article 20, the Contracting State can also decline to re-
turn the child if this would not be permitted under the fundamental
principles of the requested state relating to the protection of human
rights and fundamental freedoms. 249 According to the Perez-Vera
Report, "to refuse to return a child on the basis of this article, it will
be necessary to show that the fundamental principles of the requested
State concerning the subject-matter of the Convention do not permit
it.' ' 250 Therefore, this is to be construed as a very narrow exception.
The exceptions, if abused, could potentially provide large areas
for judicial discretion. However, based on the goals and purposes of
the Convention, these are meant to be narrow exceptions to the imme-
diate return of the child. 251
242. Id.
243. Id. art. 12.
244. Id. art. 17.
245. See Legal Analysis, supra note 189, at 10,504.
246. See Hague Convention, supra note 12, arts. 4 and 13.
247. Id. art. 13(b).
248. Id.
249. Id. art. 20.
250. See Perez-Vera, supra note 230, at 462 para. 118.
251. See Act, supra note 210, at § 2(4).
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In drafting Articles 13 and 20, the representatives of countries
participating in negotiations on the Convention were aware that
any exceptions had to be drawn very narrowly lest their applica-
tion undermine the express purposes of the Convention - to effect
the prompt return of abducted children. Further, it was generally
believed that courts would understand and fulfill the objectives of
the Convention by narrowly interpreting the exceptions and al-
lowing their use only in clearly meritorious cases, and only when
the person opposing return had met the burden of proof .... The
courts retain the discretion to order the child returned even if they
consider that one or more of the exceptions applies.
252
Therefore, pursuant to the direct intention of the Convention, the
judicial authorities should follow the express intent of their individual
countries and the spirit of the Convention. In a situation where a
proceeding is activated within one year of the removal or retention, it
should be clear that the child would be returned to the country of his
or her habitual residence. The parents would then have the opportu-
nity to litigate custody on the merits in that forum.
In a situation where an application is commenced over one year
after the wrongful removal or retention, Article 12 provides that the
child is to be returned unless it is determined that the child is now
settled in his or her new environment.253 It also appears, in this case,
that the general exceptions in Articles 13 and 20 would still apply. A
petitioner seeking return of a child has to establish by a preponder-
ance of the evidence that the child was wrongfully removed. 254 The
person opposing return of the child has to show that one of the excep-
tions applies by clear and convincing evidence. 255 Therefore, the
wrongdoing parent would have to meet a stronger burden of proof to
demonstrate that the child had settled into his or her new
environment.
This area seems to provide for considerably more judicial discre-
tion. A judge will be in the position of deciding if a child has settled
into a new home situation. Factors such as stability for the child,
meeting the standard of "best interests of the child", the child's age,
and his or her adjustment to a new school and friends become of para-
mount importance. These factors must then be balanced against a
presumed disinclination to reward the wrongdoing parent. This bal-
252. See Legal Analysis, supra note 189, at 10,509.
253. See Hague Convention, supra note 12, art. 12, at 10,499.
254. See Act, supra note 210, at § 102(d).
255. Id.
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ancing of factors starts to take on the flavor of a decision on the mer-
its of the case, an issue the Convention attempted to avoid. The
courts should conform to the general spirit of the Convention and
exercise their discretion to return a child even if the action is com-
menced over one year after the removal.
In addition, in the United States the victimized parent has re-
course to the UCCJA. As discussed previously, the United States
courts have recognized foreign nation custody decrees and have re-
turned abducted children. 256 A major difference, however, is that the
UCCJA provides for a return to the legal status quo which existed
before the abduction, while the Hague Convention provides for a re-
turn to the factual status quo. 2 5 7 The Hague Convention does not
require a custody decree, whereas the UCCJA enforces an existing
decree, or one that is received by the victimized parent after the ab-
duction.258 Provided that the abducting parent has received opportu-
nity and notice to be heard, the UCCJA will enforce a custody decree
received subsequent to the abduction.
If a parent has a legal custody decree, he or she might want to
proceed under the UCCJA since the Hague Convention exceptions,
such as the consequences of the one year time lapse, do not apply to
the UCCJA. However, the parent who has a custody decree can pro-
ceed under both the UCCJA and the Convention. In a situation
where a child from the United States is abducted to a Contracting
State abroad, the above discussion concerning the Convention would
apply. The parent might also be able to proceed under the laws of
that particular country.
However, in the second hypothetical, when a United States child
is abducted to a foreign state which has not ratified the Convention, a
different problem arises. A parent would be limited to remedies avail-
able through the courts in that country. The victimized parent would
have no guarantee that the foreign state would recognize or enforce
an existing custody decree from the United States. Absent a UCCJA-
type system in the foreign country, the parent would have to litigate
in the new country with all its attendant difficulties. There would be
no Central Authority for the victimized parent to turn to, and no
mechanism to activate for a return of the child to the factual status
quo. Moreover, if the victimized parent had no custody order from
256. See supra text accompanying notes 68-124.




the United States, that parent would only have recourse to the courts
in the foreign country.
This problem is arising with increasing frequency for United
States servicemen stationed abroad.259 Very often a serviceman will
marry, have children and then return to the United States. The for-
eign wife might then return to her home country, taking the children
with her. If that country has not ratified the Convention, the service-
man has a very limited list of remedies available to him. Therefore,
foreign states with a high proportion of United States servicemen,
such as West Germany, must be encouraged to ratify the Convention.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Convention is a positive step forward in the protection of
children and victimized parents. If ratified by enough countries, the
Convention should provide a strong deterrent for the wrongful re-
moval of children. The foreign states that were parties to the Conven-
tion should ratify it as soon as possible. As the number of children
abducted to foreign countries continues to increase, it becomes imper-
ative that the United States and other countries ratify the Convention
and implement enabling legislation in their respective countries so
that the Convention will go into full force and effect. The longer it
takes for the Convention to be ratified, the more haven countries will
exist for abducting parents. This situation must be eliminated so that
a consistent and uniform system for the return of children abducted
abroad will be established.
Barbara Ullman Schwerin*
259. See supra note 211.
* The author is also a licensed Marriage, Family and Child Counselor in California.
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